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Sustainable development: an 
ecological economics 
perspective 
AdemAr ribeiro romeiro
   Introduction
ThiS paper aims to provide a definition of sustainable development from an ecological economics perspective. Since the term emerged in the 1970s under the name of eco-development, its most accurate de-
finition has been the object of controversy (Veiga, 2005). To be sustainable, 
development must be economically sustainable (or efficient), socially desirable 
(or inclusive) and ecologically prudent (or balanced). The first two criteria were 
present in the debate on economic development started in the post-war period. 
The third is new. The terms “sustained economic growth” and “exclusionary 
economic growth” opposed the neoclassical mainstream current to the hetero-
dox, Marxist and structuralist currents. To the first, sustained economic growth1 
was open as a possibility to all countries, being a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for social inclusion. To the second, on the contrary, economic growth and 
its benefits were for the few, the core capitalist countries. Marxists and struc-
turalists disagreed among themselves, however, about the causes of the fact. 
Nonetheless, they have all rejected the idea of  environmental limits to growth as 
proposed by the Club of rome.
The environmental criterion proposed by eco-developmentalists was ac-
ceptable to these currents, but the way they integrated it to the other criteria 
put them in a unique position in this debate. The goal of the second section 
of this paper is to analyze this trajectory of formulation and evolution of the 
concept of eco-development. Due to their assumptions and propositions, eco-
-developmentalists have taken a unique position vis-à-vis other currents under 
debate: they shared the rejections of the idea of  zero growth; but differentiated 
themselves from each of them: in relation to the mainstream, because of their 
concern for potentially important environmental losses and poverty and income 
concentration; in relation to Marxism and structuralism, for assuming that the 
situation of poor countries resulted from predominantly endogenous factors.
The emergence of the global warming issue in the 1990s had a major im-
pact on the debate about sustainable development in two fundamental aspects: 
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the approach to environmental risk and, again, the issue of trade-off between 
economic growth and the environment. regarding the first aspect, the notion of 
prudence gives way to the most appropriate and accurate concept of precaution, 
which has been raised to the condition of principle and was formally adopted at 
the rio 92 Conference. The issue of ecosystem uncertainty in the case of global 
warming and its mitigation based on the precautionary principle (as proposed 
by the Kyoto protocol) highlights the second aspect mentioned, since the rapid 
reduction of emissions is costly. although eco-developmentalists did not deny 
the existence of some sort of “trade-off” between economic growth and the en-
vironment, the assumption was that this would be negligible provided that the 
set of proposed policies was adopted.
The concept of sustainable development in its most recent disguise of 
green economy reflects this problem in that it incorporates the need for adop-
ting sustainability parameters while taking into account the environmental risk. 
regarding the alleged “trade-off” between economic growth and the environ-
ment, its inexistence is reaffirmed, but reinforcing especially the arguments that 
justify this assumption based on expectations of advances in the generation of 
“triple winner” technologies: in social, economic and environment terms.
The third section of the paper presents the theoretical foundations that 
justify the position of the mainstream rejection of the conclusions of the Club 
of rome report and of optimism about the ability to overcome only relative 
environmental limits to economic growth. This optimism stems from two as-
sumptions: there are almost no limits to increased efficiency in the use of natural 
resources, and these can be largely replaced by capital. The environmental pro-
blem is seen primarily as a market failure due to the nature of natural resources 
such as air and water as public goods, thus generating a negative externality 
problem.
in this sense, the most efficient environmental policy is one that creates 
the conditions for economic agents to “internalize” the costs of the degradation 
they cause. State action is necessary only to correct this market failure, either 
through privatization or the pricing of natural resources. Once these failures 
have been resolved to ensure the correct economic signals of the relative scarcity 
of these environmental services, the dynamic of intertemporal allocation of re-
sources based on cost-benefit assessments would tend to be processed efficien-
tly, with no problems such as uncertainty and risk of irreversible losses. it must 
be said however, that not everyone in this current has accepted these logical 
conclusions based on the assumptions made, considering that there are many 
situations in which one should opt for the preservation of a given ecosystem due 
to its importance and irreplaceability.
 in the fourth and fifth sections the paper elaborates on the argument 
for defining sustainable development from an ecological economics perspec-
tive. in the fourth section, initially the criticism of environmental economics 
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assumptions enables developing a concept of ecological sustainability that does 
not exist in the various definitions of sustainable development. it is not possi-
ble to increase indefinitely the efficient use of natural resources (second law of 
thermodynamics), and capital is essentially complementary to natural resources, 
which are represented especially by complex ecosystems that are vital for human 
survival. Therefore, the production of materials/energy cannot be indefinitely 
increased, and this will require the end of economic growth at some point, to 
prevent the carrying capacity of the planet – which science in unable to accura-
tely estimate - from being exceeded. 
From these assumptions, the central issue for ecological economics is how 
to get the economy to work while accepting the existence of these limits. Two 
action plans need to be considered: (1) one concerns specific policies for each 
type of environmental problem to be tackled; (2) the other is related to the 
stabilization of the system’s expansion at a sustainable level - zero growth. re-
garding the first action plan, in the case of ecological economics, reversing the 
rationale behind the decision of environmental economics would suffice: the 
amount of natural resources to be used - scale - must be previously defined 
based on ecological sustainability parameters. Setting limits to the use of natu-
ral resources raises the problem of their distribution among the various actors, 
which should be based on the criterion of justice. Finally, the market will be 
responsible for the efficient allocation of investments within the framework of 
these ecological and social constraints.
as for the second action plan, which is the topic of the fifth and final sec-
tion, the paper briefly examines the two problems to be addressed for achieving 
zero growth: (a) stopping economic growth without generating a crisis; (b) 
consumer expectations in consumer societies. The technical solution to the first 
problem is especially the formulation of macroeconomic policies, an environ-
mental macroeconomics. Specifically, it entails facing, for example, the issue of 
employment, inequality and incentive to technological innovation.
The legitimacy for implementing these policies depends on the solution to 
the second problem, the one about consumer expectations that legitimates eco-
nomic growth policies. The acceptance by the population of consumption cons-
traints for the benefit of the populations of other countries and/or of a distant 
future necessarily implies a certain amount of altruism. however, this necessary 
altruism that legitimizes zero growth policies can be enhanced by the growing 
realization that the current level of material comfort is more than enough, and 
that continuing growth efforts will produce more harm than good. a definition 
of sustainable development is therefore proposed.
The concept of sustainable development 
The concept of sustainable development emerged under the name of eco-
development2 in the 1970s. it resulted from the effort to find a third alternative 
path to those that put developmentalists on the one side and advocates of zero 
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growth on the other. For the latter, called “zeroists” or (pejoratively) “neo-Mal-
thusians”, environmental limits would lead to catastrophes if economic growth 
was not stopped.
The controversy that put developmentalists against “zeroists” began with 
the publication of the report prepared by the Meadows couple, from MiT, un-
der the auspices of the Club of rome, on environmental limits to economic 
growth (Meadows et al., 1972)3, whose conclusion was that economic growth 
needed to be stopped to prevent the depletion of natural resources and pollu-
tion from causing a sharp drop in living standards. The first United Nations 
Conference on environment held in Stockholm in 1972 was the stage of this 
polarization that tended to generate deadlocks. This conclusion came at a time 
of strong global economic growth driven by the recovery from the post-war 
chaos (“The Glorious Thirty”) and the rise of some emerging nations such as 
the “asian Tigers” and of Brazil as the country of the “economic miracle”. in 
turn, the vast majority of countries remained poor, with problems to start a pro-
cess of sustained economic growth.
Until then the great controversy about economic development put on 
the one side those who saw the scenario of global inequality as a problem of 
historical stages in the process of economic growth, i.e., each country would be 
able, at a given time, to start a trajectory of sustained economic growth, which 
was seen as a necessary and sufficient condition for social development.4 The 
difficulties that many countries faced in order to meet the conditions necessary 
to take off towards the process of sustained economic growth resulted primari-
ly from endogenous factors (rostow, 1960). On the other side were those who 
saw both international inequality and national inequality (concentrated income 
distribution in poor countries) as a result of some form of perverse articulation 
between rich and poor countries for the benefit of the first and of a minority, 
a small elite, in the latter. in other words, inequality stemmed primarily from 
exogenous factors related to the form of unfavorable inclusion of poor countries 
in the international division of labor.5
initially, all currents rejected the conclusions of the Club of rome report.6 
To mainstream economists firstly because there were theoretical reasons (which 
will be discussed in the next section) to reject the idea that natural resources 
could represent an absolute limit to economic growth; and secondly because of 
the socioeconomic and political7 consequences of zero growth for both poor 
and rich countries. To the representatives of the second current there were no 
theoretical reasons to justify defending the lack of environmental limits to eco-
nomic growth. The problem was also in the socio-economic implications of this 
idea, but related to the perpetuation of exclusion in favor of central capitalist 
countries.8
The first UN reactions following the Stockholm Conference, with the su-
pport of eco-developmentalists, were not only to defend the need for economic 
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growth in poor countries, but also to consider poverty itself as one of the root 
causes of environmental problems in those countries. according to the Cocoyok 
Declaration (1974),9 the population boom would be the result of the lack of all 
types of resources, which in turn would lead this population to overuse the land, 
water and other natural resources. The responsibility of industrialized countries 
to the problems of underdevelopment would lie in over-consumption. They 
would have to reduce their consumption levels and disproportionate partici-
pation in the pollution of the biosphere. The positions taken in Cocoyok were 
consolidated in the Dag-hammarskjöld report (1975),10 which goes further to 
pinpoint the responsibilities of industrialized countries resulting from the legacy 
of colonialism. The colonial system would have concentrated the land suitable 
for agriculture in the hands of a social minority and european settlers. Conse-
quently, large masses of the original population were expelled and marginalized, 
and forced to use less suitable land.11
The conciliatory proposition of eco-developmentalists is based on a nor-
mative concept of what development can and should be: it is possible to maintain 
efficient (sustainable) economic growth in the long term alongside improved 
social conditions (by distributing income) while respecting the environment. 
however, efficient economic growth is seen as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for improving human welfare: the desired income distribution (the 
primary indicator of social inclusion) does not automatically result from econo-
mic growth, which can be socially exclusionary; specific public policies designed 
to prevent growth from benefiting only a minority are necessary; likewise, the 
ecological balance can be adversely affected by economic growth and limit it in 
the long run without the help of ecologically prudent policies that encourage 
the increase of eco-efficiency and reduce the risk of potentially important envi-
ronmental losses.
in the case of poor countries, this set of policies would provide an oppor-
tunity for them to start a process of sustained economic growth, distributing 
income and avoiding repeating the trajectory of environmental impacts of de-
veloped countries. More than an opportunity, these policies would be the very 
condition for a development based chiefly on the endogenous forces of those 
countries (“self reliance”).
Because of their assumptions and propositions, eco-developmentalists 
have taken a unique position in relation to other currents under debate: they 
share with all of them the rejection of the  zero growth idea, but differentiate 
themselves from each of them: in relation to the mainstream for its concern 
about potentially important environmental losses and poverty and income con-
centration; in relation to Marxism and structuralism, because they assumed that 
the situation of poor countries resulted from essentially endogenous factors, 
although they also pointed to the need for developed countries to show solida-
rity in the struggle to overcome international inequality - either by increasing 
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foreign aid or by correcting business and financial mechanisms that are unfavo-
rable to developing countries (see Sachs, 1981, 1986).
at the beginning of the following decade, UNep organized the Nairobi 
Conference in 1982, when the decision was made to create a World Commission 
on environment and Development under the leadership of the prime Minister 
of Norway, Gro harlem Brundtland. The results of the effort were made  public 
in 1987, in a document entitled Our Common Future, also known as the Brun-
dtland report (1991). Similarly to eco-developmentalists, the authors of the 
report considered that the environmental risk of economic growth should be 
taken seriously, a concern that was expressed in the motto defining what should 
be understood as sustainable development:12 “the development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs.” Sustainable development can be achieved through 
a set of policies capable of simultaneously guaranteeing the increase in national 
income and access to basic social rights (economic security, access to health and 
education) and reducing the impact of increased production and consumption 
on the environment. Thereafter, the term “sustainable development” has repla-
ced almost completely the term “eco-development”, while expressing the same 
normative concept.
The second UN Conference on the environment took place in rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, the same year in which an update of the first Club of rome 
report was published ratifying the key conclusions of the original document. 
interestingly, twenty years after the first conference, it had become clearer that 
technical progress - the magic wand of optimistic developmentalists - had been 
much more efficient in addressing the issue of the environment as (a) a provider 
of raw materials than in confronting the issue of the environment as (b) a pro-
vider of ecosystem services: (a) the prices of raw materials had fallen, thanks to 
technical progress in the exploitation of natural resources, in the replacement of 
expensive inputs for cheaper ones, and in the (ecological) efficiency of their use; 
(b) however, pollution and the degradation of ecosystems had increased despite 
technical progress.
This second fact (b) is reflected in the updated report of the Club of 
rome, whose main highlight is the destruction of ecosystems and its implica-
tions in the carrying capacity of the planet, to the extent that ecosystems as a 
whole provide the main ecosystem service, i.e., the ability to absorb and recycle 
the waste generated by human activities. The risk of depletion of non-renewable 
raw materials, especially oil, pales before this. in any event, the conclusion of the 
analysis remains the same: economic growth needs to be stopped.13
another important fact to note in the socioeconomic context of that time 
was the realization - taking Brazil was an iconic case - that economic growth by 
itself could be highly exclusionary. high income concentrations could persist 
despite years of strong economic growth, because of structural problems that 
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could only be solved through more active State intervention. These facts have 
contributed to strengthen the position of advocates of the concept of sustaina-
ble development: there is a risk of important environmental losses, and econo-
mic growth can be socially exclusionary; the solution is a set of public policies 
that remove structural obstacles to the dynamic redistribution of income and 
address environmental problems with caution and ecological efficiency (techni-
cal progress).
The emergence of the global warming issue in the 1990s, however, ulti-
mately brougth the debate to a new level in relation to two key aspects: (a) the 
assessment of environmental risk; (b) the “trade-off” between economic growth 
and the environment. regarding the first aspect, the notion of prudence gives 
way to the most appropriate and accurate concept of precaution, raised to the 
condition of principle - formally adopted at the rio 92 Conference. prudence 
applies to situations of risk in which the distribution of probabilities is known. 
precaution applies when there is uncertainty. in the first case, safety procedures 
can be defined with probable margins of precision, thus enabling maintaining 
a given course of action. in the second case there is only one safety procedure: 
stopping or reducing the course of action in order to buy time for the acquisition 
of new knowledge that reduces or eliminates uncertainty (hourcade, 1997).
in the case of global warming and its confrontation based on the precau-
tionary principle (as proposed by the Kyoto protocol), the issue of ecosystem 
uncertainty highlights the second aspect, since the rapid reduction of emissions 
is costly. although eco-developmentalists have not denied the existence of some 
sort of “trade-off” between economic growth and the environment, the as-
sumption was that this trade-off would be negligible provided that the set of 
proposed policies was adopted. policies that supposedly addressed the risk of 
environmental losses in a proper way, based on prudence. actually this “trade-
-off” has become the main reason for results to have fallen short of what was 
expected in the successive conferences on the environment after rio-92.
The difficulties in implementing the Kyoto protocol14 have reinforced the 
position - based on the work of William Nordhaus15 – of the advocates of smoo-
th, low cost induction of change in the energy matrix (decarbonization) through 
moderate fees on fossil fuels, which minimizes or ignores the uncertainty about 
the possibility of potentially catastrophic, irreversible losses. in turn, the reports 
of the intergovernmental panel on Climate Change (ipCC) have reinforced the 
arguments of environmentalists in favor of stronger action to reduce emissions. 
The Stern review (2006) represented something of an effort to respond to the 
recurring deadlock: by agreeing with environmentalists (and ecological econo-
mists), it accepts upfront the need to identify a sustainable scale (it considers a 
maximum temperature rise of 2°C). Stern criticizes the gradualism of Nordhaus, 
considering the risk of important environmental losses if the temperature rises 
above that limit. Once a limit has been established - which represents a scale of 
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use of natural resources – it will be then necessary to seek a cost-effective solu-
tion. his decision rule is that of environmental efficacy and cost-effectiveness. 
To him, gradualist models such as that of Nordhaus do not reckon a number 
of impacts and, in particular, catastrophic impacts. regarding the latter, Stern 
works with subjective probability distributions although, as pointed out by Vale 
(2011, p.127), he recognizes not being sure about which probability distribu-
tion he should use and so he arbitrarily increases the estimated costs of inaction.
The explicit concern about intergenerational distribution (and justice) lea-
ds him also to adopt a very low, close to zero discount rate. however, he explici-
tly rejects the idea of  zero growth as the ultimate solution to the environmental 
problem. Similarly to eco-developmentalists, he proposes a set of environmental 
policies capable of taking the environmental risk into account, but with low 
“trade-off” between economic growth and the environment. in contrast, ho-
wever, he structures these policies based on a framework of macroeconomic 
scenarios where the environmental costs of inaction are estimated.
in the recent report of the United Nations environment program on 
Green economy (UNep, 2011), the fundamental eco-developmental premise 
is explicitly stated,16, but similar to the Stern review it is included in a stricter 
macro-economic analytical framework. Two key aspects of this analytical scheme 
deserve to be highlighted: firstly, environmental risks can be estimated, there-
fore enabling the simulation of scenarios showing the cost-benefit of adopting 
a particular set of policies;17 secondly, the problems stem primarily from the 
inefficient allocation of production factors; this inefficiency, in turn, results from 
market failures related to ecosystem services, as well as from wrong incentives 
arising from existing public policies. also worth noting is the explicit adoption 
of the “unorthodox” premise that capital and natural resources are not perfect 
substitutes; ecosystem services in particular would be very limitedly replaced by 
capital.
policy proposals are a mix of command and control policies and with po-
licies based on economic instruments. in relation to the first, an aggressive en-
vironmental regulation is also recommended to anticipate future scarcity. as for 
the second,  beyond the pricing of ecosystem services, it will be necessary to 
virtually reverse the signals of an economic incentive structure which, in key-
-sectors such as energy and transport favor the use of fossil fuels and individual 
transport. Developing countries have specificities - such as large portions of the 
population still living on forestry activities and small subsistence agriculture - 
that need to be addressed through specific policies. Supposedly, the “greening” 
of these activities would be capable of simultaneously increasing the supply of 
jobs and labor productivity and therefore of income. There is no “trade-off” 
between economic growth and the environment. The issue of environmental 
limits raised by the Club of rome would be nothing but a “myth”.18
There is a great expectation towards the role of technology: “green” te-
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chnologies which are “triple winner”: environmentally friendly, socially appro-
priate and economically efficient. another UN report (DeSa, 2011), whose 
title precisely expresses this expectation, indicates the policies required to sti-
mulate technological change, especially so that emerging countries may be able 
to “leapfrog” directly into these new triple-winner technologies. The techno-
logical revolution of the green economy would be different for three reasons: 
(a) the short period of time within which it should occur given the pressure 
on ecosystems; (b) because of that and the limitations of market mechanisms, 
governments will have to play a much more active role in the production and 
dissemination of technology; (c) the need for international cooperation, since 
the main environmental problems are global in nature.
Environmental economics: the thermodynamic SaciTN and the ca-
pitalist Midas 
From the point of view of environmental economics (neoclassical mainstre-
am), natural resources (as a source of both inputs and ecosystem services) do 
not represent, in the long run, an absolute limit to economic growth.
This position is based on two premises: (a) there are almost no limits for 
scientific / technological progress to increase efficiency in the use of natural 
resources (eco-efficiency); and (b) capital, labor and natural resources can per-
fectly replace one another.19 Thus, on the one hand waste emission would tend 
towards zero with the endless increase in the efficient use of natural resources, 
causing the progressive decoupling of the economic growth process from its 
materials/energy base; the economy operates in a world as if the second law of 
thermodynamics, the Law of entropy, does not apply. in turn, natural ecosys-
tems that are inevitably lost due to human expansion would be easily replaced 
by capital. Therefore, it is a world where a thermodynamic saci pererê and a 
capitalist king Midas working together would guarantee perpetual economic 
growth.20
Thus, the availability of natural resources (Nr) can be a constraint to eco-
nomic growth, but only a relative constraint that can be indefinitely overcome 
by scientific and technological progress. it all happens as if the economic system 
could move smoothly from a resource base to another as each of them is exhaus-
ted, with scientific and technological progress as the key variable to ensure that 
the replacement process will not limit economic growth, thus guaranteeing its 
sustainability in the long term. at the limit, as provocatively stated by Solow 
(1974),21 the economy could get by along without natural resources!
in the literature this idea became known through the concept of weak sus-
tainability. an economy is considered “non-sustainable” if gross savings are less 
than the combined depreciation of produced and non-produced assets - natural1 
TN   in Brazilian folklore, a one-legged black or mulatto youngster with holes in the palms   of his hands, 
who smokes a pipe and wears a magical red cap that enables him to disappear and reappear wherever 
and whenever he wishes.
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resources (atkinson et al., 1997). The underlying idea is that investment com-
pensates future generations for asset losses caused by curr2ent consumption and 
production (formally presented by the “hartwick rule”).
according to this current, the incentive mechanisms through which this 
indefinite expansion of environmental limits to economic growth occurs should 
be especially market mechanisms. in the case of environmental goods traded 
in markets (material and energy inputs), the growing shortage of a particular 
good would translate easily into an increase in its price, thus leading to the in-
troduction of innovations that enable saving it (eco-efficiency), and, at the limit, 
replacing it with another more abundant resource. in the case of environmental 
services generally not traded in the market due to their nature as public goods 
(air, water, global biochemical life support cycles, ability to absorb waste, etc.), 
this market mechanism fails. Correcting this failure requires interventions, so 
that the willingness to pay for these environmental services can be expressed as 
their scarcity increases.
it would have been empirically observed that the natural evolution of 
the individuals’ preferences resulting from the economic growth process itself 
would be towards lower tolerance of this growing shortage of these services due 
to pollution, representing what can be expressed as an environmental Kuznets 
Curve (Figure 1): as per capita income rises with economic growth, environ-
mental degradation increases up to a point from which the environmental qua-
lity starts to improve. The explanation for this would be that in the early stages 
of the economic development process, increasing environmental degradation 
is accepted as a negative, but inevitable, side effect. however, after a certain 
level of economic well-being, people become more sensitive and willing to pay 
for the improvement of environmental quality, which would have led to the 
introduction of institutional innovations and organizational measures to correct 
market failures arising from the public nature of most environmental services. 
These institutional and organizational innovations, in turn, guarantee a pace of 
introduction of technical innovations in production processes capable of com-
pensating for the pressure of economic activities on the environment (Grossman 
and Krueger, 1995).
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Per capita income
Pollution
Figure 1 – The environmental Kuznets Curve
The optimal solution would be that which could somehow create the con-
ditions for the free operation of market mechanisms: either directly, through the 
elimination of the public nature of these goods and services by defining proper-
ty rights over them (Coasian bargaining), or indirectly through the economic 
valuation of the deterioration of these goods and the application of these values 
by the state through taxes (pigouvian tax). The first would entail privatizing re-
sources such as water, air etc. which, among other obstacles, would collide with 
the high transaction costs arising from bargaining processes involving hundreds 
or even thousands of agents.
The second assumes that it is possible to calculate the values  from a margi-
nal curve of environmental degradation. Thus, economic agents would enjoy a 
“trade-off” between their (marginal) pollution control costs and the (marginal) 
costs of environmental impacts (externalities) caused by their production activi-
ties, which they would be forced to “internalize” by paying the corresponding 
taxes (prices) (Figure 2): economic agents will seek to minimize the total cost 
resulting from the sum of how much they will spend to control pollution (con-
trol cost) with the amount to be paid for pollution taxes (degradation cost). 
The optimization point is called “optimal pollution”, in which the total cost is 
minimized.
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Marginal degradation
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Total 
Cost
Production/PollutionOptimal pollution 
Figure 2 – Optimal pollution 
The most efficient environmental policy is that which creates the condi-
tions through pricing for economic agents to “internalize” the costs of the de-
gradation they cause. ensuring “sustainability” would be ultimately a problem 
of intertemporal allocation of resources between consumption and investment 
by rational economic agents whose motivations basically maximize utility. Col-
lective action (through the State) is necessary only to correct market failures 
that occur because most environmental services are public goods (air, water, 
ability to absorb waste, etc.) and therefore have no price. Once these failures 
have been resolved to ensure the correct economic signals of the relative scarcity 
of these environmental services, the dynamics of the intertemporal allocation of 
resources based on cost-benefit assessments would tend to be processed effi-
ciently, with no problems of uncertainty and risk of irreversible losses.
Not everyone, however, has accepted that this logical conclusion based on 
the assumptions made. For long, economists participating in this current have 
been concerned about the risk of potentially important irreversible environ-
mental losses; important in that they can cause significant losses of well-being 
that could be prevented. This dilemma between the conservation and exhaus-
tion of a given ecosystem has been structured as a discrete choice issue, which 
recognizes that there are many situations in which the full conservation or the 
irreversible transformation of a given ecosystem can be legitimately claimed. 
The problem is defining which one. and economists, as noted by pearce & Tur-
ner (1990), have not solved this problem. however, they have proposed some 
pioneering methods that could contribute to that, such as those by Krutilla & 
Fisher (1985), Ciriacy-Wantrup (1952) and Bishop (1978).
Krutilla & Fisher have developed an algorithm to ensure that the benefits 
of the conservation option are correctly factored into the basic equation of a 
cost-benefit analysis applied to the environmental problem. Thus, the estimated 
value of the benefits that the conservation of a given resource would entail be-
gins to be treated as part of the costs of  the development project. This value, in 
turn, takes into account the fact that the price of this natural resource (δ) would 
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tend to increase over time, as it becomes progressively scarcer. Furthermore, it is 
believed that technical progress (φ) can have a negative effect on the economic 
viability of the development project in question (or of maintaining a given cour-
se of action) by making other investment options attractive.22 The introduction 
of the price factor and the technology factor differentiates the Krutilla-Fisher 
algorithm from more conventional analysis by  moving the “benefit of the dou-
bt” to the conservation side. Thus, the risks inherent in the cost-benefit analysis 
would be reduced in situations in which the losses can be very importantes.23
The pioneering work of William Nordhaus (1993, 2008) is the main re-
ference in the “mainstream” effort to treat with rigor a problem that in theory 
should not require special treatment. Theoretically, the problem of global war-
ming could be solved like that of any other environmental externality resul-
ting from a market failure in the use of public natural resources, by pricing the 
ecosystem service of climate regulation. Thus, as the cost of warming increases 
progressively, the market would induce the introduction of technological solu-
tions that reduce the cost of controlling greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation).
initially, as pointed out by Vale (2011), Nordhaus found that the laissez-
-faire would not be enough, and that State intervention beyond pricing would 
be required (as in the establishment of minimum efficiency standards for engi-
nes), in order to force a faster adjustment of emissions to adequate safety levels.24 
however, he abandoned this idea, which is alien to neoclassical orthodoxy, to 
favor a strictly orthodox treatment of internalization of a global environmental 
externality. The big challenge, then, would be to estimate marginal curves of 
control cost (mitigation) and pollution cost for a complex and very long term 
global problem.  Nordhaus’ feat was precisely that, i.e., to estimate a very long-
-term marginal cost curve for global warming based on the optimization of an 
intertemporal economic growth model, which would enable putting a price on 
the ecosystem service of CO2 absorption capable of, when added to the prices of 
fossil fuels, internalizing (and solving) the global warming issue.25
Considering the structure of the Krutilla-Fisher algorithm, Nordhaus’ 
model has the effect of making clear to economic agents the benefits of chan-
ging the current energy mix based on fossil fuels: over time, the present value of 
the benefits of the current energy mix falls due to technical progress (κ) in alter-
native sources (mitigation costs), while the value (δ) of the service ecosystem of 
CO2 absorption, as measured by the cost of emissions, increases because of its 
growing scarcity, until it is completely replaced by another energy mix (“backs-
top technology”). These movements characterize a ‘ramp’: between 1990 and 
2010 carbon prices should rise slightly because environmental damages would 
be few and technological options would be costly. as of 2010, prices should rise 
sharply. Thus, Nordhaus manages to maintain allocative efficiency as a rule of 
decision in terms of marginal cost-benefit to address an environmental problem 
that he had singled out initially as deserving special, non-marginalist State action.
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Ecological economics: sustainable scale and the law of entropy
From the standpoint of ecological economics, the environment represents 
an absolute limit to the expansion of the economy, which is one of its subsys-
tems. however, if by definition a subsystem cannot be larger than the system 
that contains it, its size in relation to the whole does not have the system as its 
maximum limit, but rather its carrying capacity, which is defined by thresholds 
of ecosystem resilience. This is one of the fundamental premises of ecological 
economics that has its origin in the work of Kenneth e. Boulding. To illustrate 
this idea, Boulding (1966) uses the analogy of the “cowboy economy” and the 
“spaceship economy”. in the first, the economic subsystem - the cowboy in the 
great plains – does not have enough critical mass to cause some important irre-
versible ecosystem impact; in the latter, the size of the economic subsystem - the 
spaceship crew - is large enough to endanger its own survival if the resources 
available are not handled carefully. it is not possible to replace essential ecosys-
tem services with capital. Natural resources (natural capital) are complementary 
to capital and/or labor. The current size of the economic subsystem and its 
rapid expansion bring the planet (“Spaceship earth”) closer to the second.26
With regard to population growth, the idea of  limits of “Spaceship earth” 
is generally accepted by all, including neoclassical environmental economists. 
The difficulty lies in the idea that economic growth, increasing production and 
per capita income are also limited by the size of Spaceship earth.
This limitation is due to the law of entropy, according to which no  pro-
ductive matter and energy change activity (first law of thermodynamics) is pos-
sible without an irreversible entropic degradation process that generates waste 
(second law of thermodynamics); it is possible to reduce the amount of waste by 
increasing eco-efficiency, but beyond a certain point there are insurmountable 
entropic limits. This is another fundamental premise of ecological economics 
which has its origin especially in the work of N. Georgescu-roegen (1971).
Based on these two assumptions, herman Daly (1996), the pioneer res-
ponsible for incorporating these ideas into a theoretical body that founded eco-
logical economics, concludes that the total waste inevitably generated by the 
extraction, processing and consumption of natural resources in a given period 
of time (which he calls “throughput”) cannot exceed the carrying capacity of 
the earth and that, therefore, zero growth is the only way to prevent that from 
happening.
The thermodynamic destabilizing effects of human activities result from 
two sources. The first source of imbalance is the expansion of human occupa-
tion of the space. rich estuarine ecosystems give way to cities and ports; huge 
natural spaces are radically transformed by agriculture, forestry and animal hus-
bandry. The second is the introduction of materials and energy from sources 
exogenous to the system. The minerals found in the earth’s crust at concen-
tration levels (mines) that economically justify their exploitation are inert, i.e., 
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they either do not interact or interact only marginally with biological activities 
in the ecosphere.27 The mining, processing and consumption of these materials 
result in the production of waste that will be dispersed in the ecosphere, forcing 
ecosystems to adapt in order to absorb them. Depending on the amount, this 
waste represents a source of pollution that can affect or even destroy the ability 
of ecosystems to provide services.
These activities have impacts similar to those of volcanoes, with the di-
fference, however, of being selective: the volcanoes spew especially relatively 
high entropy materials such as silica, which are abundant in nature, so that their 
assimilation by ecosystems is easier (besides the fact that ecosystems have co-
-evolved with volcanic activities for hundreds of millions of years); human mi-
neral extraction practices, on the contrary, are focused on low-entropy materials 
concentrated in certain places by telluric forces for million years, thus hindering 
their assimilation by ecosystems. added to these materials are those produced 
artificially, an already huge number of new substances whose impacts on ecosys-
tems and directly on humans are not well known, such as pOps (persistent 
Organic pollutants), hormone-mimicking molecules, etc. in the long term, the-
refore, the sustainability of the economic system is not possible without the 
stabilization of waste (and heat)28 production levels according to the carrying 
capacity of the planet. This is the biggest limiting factor: the environment as 
a producer of ecosystem services and not as a producer of non-renewable raw 
materials. Services that cannot be replaced by capital and that the market is in-
capable of adequately taking into account.29
Once the existence of a carrying capacity that cannot be exceeded is re-
cognized, the next issue is its size. To what extent human pressure on ecosyste-
ms can be absorbed by these without a catastrophic rupture? Great efforts have 
been made  in this regard. according to rockstrom et al. (2009a, 2009b), for 
example, the current scale of human activities would have already exceeded the 
limits of ecosystem services of biodiversity, nitrogen cycle and climate regula-
tion. however, although these efforts are required, it must be recognized that 
these ecosystem services result from complex ecosystems that have, inter alia, 
the property of resilience, i.e., the ability to rebalance without rupturing (or 
phase shift, to use a more precise thermodynamics language), whose threshold 
cannot be fully known. it is a radical uncertainty that science is unable to solve.30
From these assumptions, the central question for ecological economics is 
how to get the economy to operate while accepting the existence of these limits. 
Two action plans need to be considered: (a) one relates to specific policies for 
each type of environmental problem to be addressed; (b) the other to the sta-
bilization of global waste production at sustainable levels - zero growth. Con-
ventional environmental economics, as we saw earlier, only takes into account 
the first action plan, in that it ignores the existence of environmental limits to 
growth, based on the possibility of unlimited replacement of scarce resources 
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with abundant resources and/or capital. in the case of environmental goods tra-
ded in the markets (material and energy inputs), it is assumed that the growing 
shortage of a particular good raises its price, thus  leading to the introduction of 
innovations that enable saving it and, at the limit, replacing it with other, more 
abundant resources, whose stocks the economic agents are supposed to know, 
along with quality differences, the future course of technological progress, and 
demand itself. in fact, as pointed out by Daly (1996), the prices reflect the 
availability of each resource regardless of the total stock of resources, thus pre-
venting them from being used to signal an optimal extraction process from the 
standpoint of sustainability.
in the case of environmental services not traded in the market due to their 
nature as public goods, the adjustment mechanism proposed does not take into 
account key ecological principles to ensure sustainability, in that this mechanism 
is based on cost-benefit calculation by economic agents with a view to allocating 
resources between investments in pollution control and payment of pollution 
fees to minimize the total cost. The fees, in turn, will be calculated based on a 
set of economic valuation methodologies that measure either directly or indirec-
tly the willingness of individuals to pay for environmental goods and services.31
Therefore, the point of equilibrium, known as “optimal pollution”, is 
about  economic and not ecological balance since, as pointed out by Godard 
(1992),  one cannot talk about balance in economic terms when the assimilative 
capacity of the medium is exceeded, which is the case in point considering that 
pollution remains. The fact that the assimilative capacity is exceeded in a given 
period (t) reduces the assimilative capacity in the following period and so forth, 
and may result in irreversible loss. There is therefore a “net destruction”, and 
only their second order effects are taken into account, i.e., those that affect the 
level of well-being of other agents in the short term. This adjustment mechanism 
implies that technology and preferences (and, implicitly, income distribution) 
are used as nonphysical parameters that determine a position of equilibrium in 
which the physical variables of the quantities of goods and services used (scale) 
are adjusted. Thus, it is the allocation of investments in pollution control and 
payment, according to the technology and optimizing preferences of the agents, 
that determines the scale of use of natural resources.
in the case of the ecological economics this process needs to be reversed, 
starting by determining the sustainable scale of use of natural resources. Thus, 
what used to be process adjustment variables (amount of ecosystem goods and 
services to be used) are now being treated as physical parameters of ecological 
sustainability, to which the (now) nonphysical variables of technology and pre-
ferences should adjust. Because of the technology, the latter begin to be limited 
by the scale. Determining a sustainable scale, in turn, involves other values be-
sides the individual pursuit of maximizing gain or well-being, such as solidarity 
between and within generations. These values have to be affirmed in the context 
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of scientific controversies and uncertainties in complex cases such as those of 
global environmental problems. in such cases, the scale deemed sustainable can 
only be determined through collective decision-making processes, from pers-
pective of application of the Precautionary Principle.
Thus, without a collective intervention to define the scale that society 
deems sustainable, the improvement of environmental quality induced by envi-
ronmental degradation (the environmental Kuznets Curve) tends to be limited 
to the degradation that affects the level of well-being of the very agents making 
the decision (such as that caused by the emission of sulfurous gases, particulates, 
disposal of domestic sewage, etc.), leaving aside that whose effects involve more 
dispersed and long-term costs as is the case, for example, of the degradation 
caused by the emission of carbon dioxide responsible for the greenhouse effect 
(arrow et al. 1995).32
Once the sustainable scale has been determined, the issue of distribution 
of the right of access - which has become restricted - to a particular ecosys-
tem good or service follows suit. This issue does not exist in the conventional 
analytical scheme, since there are no environmental limits. The basic distribu-
tion criterion should be one that society considers fair. Once the distribution of 
the right of access based on a fairness criterion accepted by all has been defined, 
the allocation of available resources between investments in pollution control 
and investments in pollution payment should be made  based on market criteria.
in the case of global warming, the policies proposed by the Kyoto proto-
col followed this analytical framework. a sustainable scale of use regarding the 
capacity to absorb greenhouse gases was defined33 based on ecological criteria; 
then the distribution of the use of this capacity among signatory countries was 
established based on criteria considered fair (emission reduction based on the 
contribution of each country); and finally the allocation of investments was left 
to the carbon market, with the addition of the ingenious Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM).34
regarding the second action plan - stabilization of the level of heat and 
waste emissions in developed countries, which implies stopping economic gro-
wth (zero growth) - the problem is how to do it without generating a socioe-
conomic crisis (to be discussed in a coming section). in the case of developing 
countries, economic growth is essential to eliminate poverty and inequality. For 
those, policies like the ones advocated by UNep (2011) and by eco-develo-
pmentalists in general are the ones that should be implemented.35 politically 
and operationally, as seen in a previous section, it is possible to develop a set of 
policies that lead to institutional, organizational and technological innovations 
capable of putting these countries on a path of sustainable growth until they 
achieve levels of material comfort similar to those of developed countries.
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Final Remarks: steady state and welfare
The debate about zero growth or even degrowth36 has gained momentum 
in recent years. There are two problems to be tackled simultaneously for  achie-
ving what Daly (1996) called steady state: 37 (a) the problem of stopping growth 
without generating a socio-economic crisis; (b) the problem of consumer expec-
tations in consumer societies.
The technical solution to the first problem is mainly the formulation of 
macroeconomic policies – an environmental macroeconomics. Specifically, it is 
about tackling, for example, the problem of employment, of inequality and of 
incentive to technological innovation. The pioneering work of Victor (2008) 
for the Canadian economy, and of Jackson (2009) for the British economy, 
present options of macroeconomic policies that would enable stabilizing pro-
duction growth considering the following  issues: variations in the proportions 
between investment and consumption, changes in investment nature and con-
ditions, greater public investment, greater environmental restrictions, increased 
employment by reducing working hours, and a neutral tax reform that penalizes 
the intensive use of natural resources, among other policies.
The legitimacy for the implementation of these policies depends on the 
solution of the second problem, the one regarding consumer expectations that 
give legitimacy to the opposing, growth incentive policies. One must not lose 
sight of the fact that the emergence of mass consumer societies was unpreceden-
ted in human history and released the great mass of the population from the op-
pression of poverty. it was the result of a process of sustained economic growth. 
This, in turn, was only possible when certain cultural/institutional conditions 
coincided in Medieval europe, with certain political/geographical conditions 
that enabled the systematic introduction of technological, organizational and 
institutional innovations, giving rise to what Braudel (1979 ) termed Mutant 
Civilization.38
The acceptance by the population of environmental restrictions involving 
some sort of sacrifice for the benefit of the populations of other countries and/
or of a distant future necessarily implies a certain dose of altruism, particularly 
if these  restrictions aim to stop economic growth (romeiro, 2000). however, 
this necessary legitimizing altruism of zero growth policies may be enhanced by 
the growing realization that the current level of material comfort is more than 
enough, and that continuing growth efforts will produce more harm than good. 
a feeling that one could be moving towards what Daly & Farley (2004) called 
non-economic growth (Figure 3), in which the increase in satisfaction (utility) 
brought by economic growth is lower than the increase in dissatisfaction (disu-
tility).
The curve of marginal disutility is increasing because it reflects the ne-
gative effects of economic growth on well-being, including the effect of envi-
ronmental degradation and other risk factors, as well as the increase in social 
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entropy.39 The curve of marginal utility, in turn, is decreasing to the extent that 
the initial satisfaction of more basic needs generates a utility greater than the 
subsequent consumption of less essential goods. Daly & Farley (2004) draw 
attention to the fact that the basic rule of neoclassical economics has not been 
part of an intergenerational dialogue. as the current generation starts from an 
already high level of material comfort, increased incomes and the consequent 
increase in consumption would result in a utility gain lower than that obtained 
by the previous generation. actually, it was found that this gain tended to be 
null! Surveys of the sense of happiness of the population conducted in the Uni-
ted States on a regular basis by polling firms like Gallup and the National Opi-
nion research Center show that income growth had not been accompanied by 
an increase in the happiness of people as they perceived it. There was a positive 
correlation in the same period of time between income level and the reported 
degree of happiness – i.e., the number of self-declared happy people was higher 
in higher income brackets; however, in time series this correlation disappeared: 
the number of self-declared happy people remained constant.
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The first case is not surprising, to some extent, since stepping out of po-
verty and having increased access to goods and services is always a source of 
relief and satisfaction. The second result, apparently paradoxical (the “easterlin 
paradox”), shows that the fact that people consume more than the previous ge-
neration does not bring greater satisfaction. according to abramovitz (1989), 
this fact could be explained by a set of psycho-cultural reasons, of which one of 
the most important would be the fact that the satisfaction each individual gets 
by increasing his consumption capacity is related to the consumption capacity of 
his fellow citizens; that is, if income increases for society as a whole, the percep-
tion of increased consumption capacity vanishes. Thus, the american citizen of 
the 1990s - although his consumption capacity is much higher than that of his 
grandfather or great-grandfather – does not see it as something that can make 
him happier.
in summary, from the point of view of ecological economics, sustainable 
development should be understood as a process of improvement of human well-
-being based on a material/energy production that ensures the comfort that 
is deemed appropriate and that has been stabilized at a level consistent with 
the thermodynamic limits of the planet. Therefore, it implies a Steady State in 
which consumption growth as a factor of social emulation gives way to cultural, 
psychological and spiritual growth; a development process with as freedom, as 
defined by Sen (1999),  a process of permanent improvement in the conditions 
necessary for the full realization of “an individual’s capacity to flourish.”
Notes
1 Sustained growth understood as a long-term growth process that results from a vir-
tuous cycle of savings and investment that increases employment and income, which, 
in turn, expand opportunities for new investments.
2 This name had been suggested by Maurice Strong, director of UNep, but professor 
ignacy Sachs, from the eheSS of paris University is recognized historically as the 
leading theoretician of this concept.
3 The modeling performed was a system dynamics that had just been developed by Jay 
Forrester. a simulation based on system dynamics is essential if we want to know, 
for example, what happens in a given system when the flow of input or output of an 
exogenous source of energy or matter increases or decreases. But it cannot be used 
for “forecasting” situations involving the expansion of the system under analysis. This 
was precisely the weakness of the model, because the technological variable implies 
the possibility of relative magnification of the system (planet earth) under analysis.
4 economic growth would tend to improve income distribution by increasing scarcity 
and labor productivity, as it would have been observed historically in developed coun-
tries - the Kuznets Curve.
5 The various sub-currents sharing this view could be divided, in turn, into two groups: 
a) the group that understood international inequality as resulting from some form of 
imperialism in by the capitalist countries (Santos, 2000; Frank, 1967; arrighi, 1997); 
b) the eCLaC group, whose main intuition was to identify in the structural differen-
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ces between mainly exporting poor countries and rich industrial countries, the causes 
for the disadvantageous insertion of the first in the international division of  labor: 
deterioration in prebisch’s (1982) terms of trade and Furtado’s (1961) structural 
imbalance of production factors.
6 With the (perhaps single) exception of Furtado (1974) in The myth of economic de-
velopment. For Furtado, the conclusion of the Club of rome report would be proof 
that economic development was not for everyone, though in his analytical scheme, 
exclusion mechanisms are not directly related to environmental issues.
7 and we could say moral, as argued by Friedman (2005), in a well-documented review 
of  development theories and major historical experiences. Moral in the sense that no 
growth would ultimately mean a return to barbarism. environmental limits to growth, 
as hopefully (and poorly) argued by Friedman, could be overcome by technical progress.
8 altvater (1992) was one of the first, if not the sole author of this current that seeks 
to integrate this fact of environmental limits to growth into a theoretical framework 
that explains  international inequality; he advocates the thesis that central countries, 
aware of the limits to the availability of resources, perpetuate the underdevelopment 
of other countries (especially by manipulating external debt), with the aim of maintai-
ning them only as producers of raw materials, thus preventing them from becoming 
consumers competing for scarce resources!
9 The Cocoyok Declaration resulted in a meeting organized by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTaD) and the United Nations envi-
ronment program (UNep).
10 This is the final report of a project by the Dag hammarskjöld Foundation, which 
counted on the participation of researchers and politicians from dozens of countries. 
UNep and another 13 UN organizations have also contributed.
11 Note the difference in the position of the Marxist and structuralist currents: the liabili-
ty is more for situations created by the colonial past, which have become endogenous, 
and less for active exogenous mechanisms embedded in international relations betwe-
en center and periphery that benefit the first.
12 The term “sustainable development” had already appeared in the late 1970s in some 
studies that fueled the debate, but in the academia the term eco-development still 
prevailed.
13 in the first report, the conclusion was that if the observed trends - in relation to the 
increase in world population, industrialization, pollution, use of natural resources etc. 
–remained  unchanged, the limits of the planet would be reached within a hundred 
years. in the second, the conclusion is even more extreme, in that the rates of use of 
many essential resources and of generation of various types of pollution would have 
already exceeded the rates that would be physically sustainable. and the remedy as 
well, because it will not only be necessary to achieve zero growth as soon as possible, 
but also to significantly reduce the flows of matter and energy by rapidly increasing 
eco-efficiency. recognizing the epic nature of the proposed changes, it considers that 
facing this challenge requires more than productivity and technology; it also requires 
“maturity, compassion and wisdom” (Meadows et al., 1992).
14 The policy proposal to reduce emissions under the Kyoto protocol represents the the-
oretically optimal solution advocated by ecological economics, as will be discussed in 
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the next section.
15 The work of Nordhaus is noteworthy for its pioneering nature (dating back to the 
1970s) in addressing this global warming problem and for  its neoclassical orthodoxy.
16 The assumption is that the “environmental and social goals of a green economy can 
also generate increases in income, growth, and enhanced welfare” (UNep, 2011, 
p.16).
17 For example, it is estimated how much annual investment in renewable energy and 
energy efficiency is required (between $50-170 billion) to avoid an environmental 
cost of climate change of $500 billion! Or yet, when it is estimated that the opportu-
nity cost of deforestation is three times greater than its benefits.
18  “One of the major findings of this report is that a green economy supports growth, 
income and  jobs, and  that the so called trade-off  between economic progress and 
environmental sustainability is a myth, especially if one measures wealth as a stock of 
useful assets, inclusive natural assets, and not narrowly as flows of produced output” 
(UNep, 2001, p.622).
19 initially natural resources (r) didn’t even appear in the production function. in its 
subsequent inclusion the function type - first-degree homogeneous - Y = f(K, L, r) 
was maintained, implying that the amount of resources (r) required can be as small as 
is desired, provided that the amount of capital (K) is large enough. Georgescu-roegen 
criticized this version of the neoclassical production function (which he dubs Solow-
-Stiglitz variant) calling it “magic.” For an analysis of Georgescu-roegen’s work, see 
Chechin (2010).
20 Baumol (1986) admits the thermodynamic restriction that the efficiency of real syste-
ms cannot be increased indefinitely, but the replaceability between capital and natural 
resources would ensure perpetual economic growth. That is, the thermodynamic saci 
does not exist, but the capitalist Midas does and could handle the problem by himself. 
For an internal critique of the Baumol thesis, see amado & Sauer (2010).
21 “The world can, in effect, get along without natural resources,  so exhaustion  is just 
an event, not a catastrophe” (Solow,  1974, p.11).
22 The present value of a given development project D is deducted from the benefits of 
preservation p.
VP (D) = -1+      De -(π+φ)t dt -    Pe -(π-δ)t dt∫
∞
0
∫
∞
0
where
π is the discount rate;
δ is the variation rate in the resource’s price;
φ is the “decadence” rate given by technological progress.
23 in cases where these uncertainties are even greater and the benefits of the develop-
ment alternative are dubious, the criteria of the Krutilla-Fisher approach would not be 
sufficient to prevent irreversible losses of resources whose conservation would prove 
a posteriori to be invaluable. in this case, an alternative would be the so-called safe 
minimum standards approach (SMS), developed especially by Bishop (1978) based 
on the work of Ciriacy-Wantrup (1952). however, the need to define these standards 
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contradicts the assumptions mainstream economists work with. randall & Farmer 
(1995) consider that the cost-benefit analysis provides a good idea of the satisfaction 
of human preferences (individual), but admit that there are good reasons to impose 
a minimum safeguard standard (SMS), unless the cost of that is intolerably high. The 
definition according to which the intolerably high cost of conservation should be in 
accordance with the standard economic thinking based especially in sustaining ade-
quate levels of consumption by human populations.
24 “One persistent concern has been that man’s economic activities would reach a scale 
where the global climate would be significantly  affected. Unlike  many  of the wolf 
cries, this one, in my opinion, should be taken very seriously” (Nordhaus, 1977, 
p.341, apud Vale, 2011, p.198).
25 See Vale (2011) for a detailed analysis of the evolution of Nordhaus’s work and its 
comparison with the Stern report.
26 in the last two decades, the expansion of economic activities led by the asian giants, 
China and india have entailed an exponential growth of human pressure on the en-
vironment, despite the increase in eco-efficiency. Definitely, humanity has become an 
almost geological factor of change. We have gone for holocene to anthropocene! 
(see andrade & romeiro, to be published).
27 ecosphere is the name given to the space where life on earth is concentrated: from a 
few meters underground to a few hundred meters into the atmosphere.
28 The dissipation of heat generated by the nuclear power park in France uses about a 
third of the country’s surface water.
29 it takes an “economics of ecosystems.” See andrade & romeiro (2011).
30 Several factors explain the absence of a distribution of probabilities of a given pheno-
menon: cognitive or computational deficiency, lack of information, lack of knowledge, 
which theoretically can be overcome at some point; but there are cases of ignorance 
that cannot be eliminated. The threshold of complex ecosystems fits into the latter 
situation (see Dequech, 2011).
31 Methodologies that have their specific limitations and are applied without an adequate 
ecosystem evaluation.  For a critical analysis of these methodologies, see romeiro & 
Maia (2010).
32 in general, therefore, the decline of pollution associated with the increase in income 
was due to local institutional reforms, such as environmental legislation and incentives 
based on market mechanisms, which do not consider international and intergeneratio-
nal consequences. in other words, these reforms do not help to avoid problems when 
their costs are borne by the populations (usually poor) of other countries or by future 
generations, i.e., they do not take into account the problems related to distributive 
justice and scale.
33 Certainly economic considerations (cost of adjustment) intervened in the definition of 
what should have been determined only by scientific considerations.
34 This mechanism, proposed by the Brazilian delegation, enables non-signatory deve-
loping countries to participate in the official carbon market; a triple winner solution: 
environmental efficiency (reduced emissions), economic efficiency (lower cost of ad-
justment in developed countries) and social efficiency (creation of jobs and income in 
developing countries).
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35 See the latest works of professor Sachs (2002, 2006, 2007).
36 Georgescu-roegen believed that degrowth would be necessary for humanity to ex-
tend its life on earth. The hypothesis is that the current level of production and 
consumption in developed countries cannot be generalized to all countries; these the-
refore need to progressively degrow to make room for the necessary growth of poor 
countries (see www.degrowth.org) .
37 Daly’s (1996)  idea of Steady-State was inspired by John Stuart Mill who, in view of 
the potential of the industrial revolution to overcome the historical poverty of huma-
nity in the 19th century, envisioned the need to stabilize material production because 
of environmental limits, emphasizing that, after all, the most important activities, such 
as “education, art, religion, basic research, sports and human relations” did not de-
pended on perpetual economic growth.
38 in the medieval West, the anthropocentric view of the meaning of human presence on 
earth derived from the Judeo-Christian cosmology, in which human beings were cre-
ated by God in his image and likeness and to whom the entire earth and its resources 
are subject, coincided with territorial fragmentation and, within regions, the division 
of power between the center (the crown) and the local lord, implying the existence 
of multiple centers of decision. The first represented a remarkable change of mind in 
human history and contributed to a strongly proactive attitude in the sense of ma-
nipulating and transforming nature, by inventing new methods and procedures. The 
second enabled expressing the first, insofar as it allowed innovative agents to bargain 
their ideas with leaders in a mutual competition (see White, 1970, 1978; Jones, 1993; 
Mokyr, 1990; Landes, 1998, among others).
39 The term “social entropy”  is being used to define situations of social degradation 
such as family breakdown, loneliness, teenage pregnancy, etc.
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AbstrAct – This paper offers a definition  of sustainable development  from an ecologi-
cal economics perspective. For this, it begins with a historical analysis of the sustainable 
development concept from its origins as eco-development to its present formulation  as 
green economy. it follows an assessment of the weak sustainability concept premises 
which allows for the neoclassical environmental economics not to take into full account 
the natural reality in its environmental  policy proposals. The analysis of the ecological 
economics theoretical foundations,  in turn, has made it possible to conceive a strictly 
ecological definition of sustainability, a necessary condition  for the sustainable develop-
ment definition proposed.  Finally, the paper deals with the problem  of slowing down 
the economy  to zero  growth  without  causing a crisis and  the  problem  of changing 
the  consumption expectations in consumption societies. a definition  of sustainable 
development  is then proposed.
Keywords: Sustainable development, ecological sustainability, Thermodynamic  equi-
librium, Zero growth,  Steady-state.
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